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Abstract
Academic scholarship on Shia Muslim minorities in the West has described them as ‘a
minority within a minority’ (Sachedina 1994: 3) or as ‘the other within the other’ (Takim
2009: 143), referring to a certain sense of double-marginalization of Shia Muslims in non-
Muslim societal contexts. They need to undertake particular efforts to maintain both an
Islamic as well as particular Shia identity in terms of communal activities and practices and
public perception and recognition, responding to the rise of Islamophobia more generally
and anti-Shia sectarianism more specifically. This article problematizes this notion of a
double-marginalization of Shia minorities in the West as too simplistic. The article investi-
gates the dynamics around the creation of transnational Shia communal spaces in north-west
London, the public representation of Shia Muslim identities by networks and organizations
based there to illustrate their multilocal connectivities and internal heterogeneity. The article
is based on research in the borough of Brent, north-west London, and presents novel insights
into Shia spaces in Britain and thereby makes an important contribution to complexifying
academic discourse on Muslims in Britain which has focussed on Sunni Muslims almost
exclusively. The ethnographic data is contextualized by providing background information
on the historical and social formations of the networks and the centres examined in the
article. To analyze the multilocal spatial manifestations and connections of these network,
the article utilizes Werbner’s notion of ‘complex diasporas’ (2002, 2004, 2010) and recent
contributions to the development of a spatial methodology in Religious Studies (Knott 2005;
Vásquez 2010; Tweed 2006; McLoughlin and Zavos 2014). The article thereby constitutes
the very first attempt to apply recent contributions on the nature of diasporic religions and
their spatial multilocality to the case study of Twelver Shia networks based in London.
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Introduction
Academic scholarship on Shia Muslim minorities in the West has described
them as ‘a minority within a minority’ (Sachedina 1994: 3) or as ‘the other
within the other’ (Takim 2009: 143), referring to a certain sense of double-
marginalization of Shia Muslims in non-Muslim societal contexts. They need to
undertake particular efforts to maintain both an Islamic as well as particular
Shia identity in terms of communal activities and practices and public percep-
tion and recognition, responding to the rise of Islamophobia more generally and
anti-Shia sectarianism more specifically. This article problematizes this notion
of a double-marginalization of Shia minorities in the West as too simplistic.
The article investigates the dynamics around the creation of transnational Shia
communal spaces in north-west London, the public representation of Shia
Muslim identities by networks and organizations based there to illustrate their
multilocal connectivities and internal heterogeneity.
The article is based on research in the borough of Brent, north-west London,
between September 2014 and November 2016 as a part of a larger research
project investigating transnational Twelver Shia networks operating between
Britain and the Middle East.1 Ethnographic research was undertaken in Arabic,
Persian and English at numerous religious gatherings in twelve community
centres and five private homes, mostly located in Brent. As part of the research,
32 semi- and unstructured interviews and seven focus group discussions were
conducted, primarily with the male elites within networks and community
centres. As such, the article presents novel insights into Shia spaces in Britain
which have been overlooked in academic research with some exceptions
(Spellman 2004; Flynn 2013; Corboz 2015; Gholami 2014, 2015; Dogra
2017; Gholami and Sreberny 2018; Degli Esposti 2018a, 2018b) and thereby
makes an important contribution to complexifying academic discourse on Mus-
lims in Britain which has focussed on Sunni Muslims almost exclusively. The
ethnographic data is contextualized by providing background information on the
historical and social formations of the networks and the centres examined in the
article.
The transnational and diasporic Shia networks in London, examined in the
article, are situated in a ‘diaspora space’ (Brah 1996) marked by complexity
and heterogeneity. Therefore, Werbner’s notion of ‘complex diasporas’ (Werbner
2002; Werbner 2004; Werbner 2010) will be used. To analyze the multilocal
spatial manifestations and connections of these network, the article engages
with recent contributions to the development of a spatial methodology in
Religious Studies (Knott 2005; Vásquez 2010; Tweed 2006). It utilizes in
particular McLoughlin and Zavos’ (2014) reflections on the place of religion
in British Asian diasporas as part of which they develop different spatial scales
‘to analyse changing patterns of diasporic consciousness and practice’ (2014:
160). The article thereby constitutes the very first attempt to apply recent
contributions on the nature of diasporic religions and their spatial multilocality
to the case study of Twelver Shia networks based in London.
1 Funding for this project was provided by the Gerda Henkel Foundation.
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From diaspora2 to multilocality
Werbner (2002, 2004, 2010) develops the notion of ‘complex diasporas’ to articulate
the ‘social heterogeneity (2010: 74, original emphasis) of diasporas, the convergence
and co-existence of different, often mutually exclusive, discourses in diasporic com-
munities, and the dynamic and chaordic processes involved in their formation.3 Dias-
poras share a certain sense of ‘co-responsibility’ (Werbner 2002: 121) with other
members of their diaspora, as ‘deterritorialised imagined communities’ (Werbner
2002: 121) shaped by a shared collective memory. The ‘dual orientation (Werbner
2010: 74, original emphasis) of diasporas is articulated in their efforts to represent their
communities and to be recognised as such in the new diasporic context while at the
same time maintaining transnational links and the community’s diasporic identity;
diasporas are involved in the developments of their countries of origin, reflecting,
influencing and responding to them. Based on this double-character of diasporas,
Werbner describes them as ‘both ethnic-parochial and cosmopolitan’ (2010: 75, orig-
inal emphasis). Despite their sense of co-responsibility, diasporas are complex or
‘segmented because members of such diasporas may unite together in some contexts
and oppose each other in other contexts. Their members’ identities, in other words, are
not fixed but situationally determined’ (Werbner 2004: 900). As such, ‘diasporic groups
are characterised by multiple discourses, internal dissent, and competition for members
between numerous sectarian, gendered or political groups, all identifying themselves
with the same diaspora’ (Werbner 2002: 123).
In order to illustrate the segmentation of the Iraqi and Iranian Twelver Shia diaspora
in Brent, the article employs McLoughlin and Zavos’ (2014) reflections on the multi-
spatial dimensions of British Asian diasporas. Both suggest a discursive shift from
diaspora to multilocality in writing about the place of religion in British Asian
diasporas. Both propose a spatial multilocal configuration of diasporic communities
that unfold on four spatial scales:
– On the very local level, immigration has led to the formation of ethnically,
culturally and religiously diverse neighbourhood communities in urban areas.
Therefore, the physicality of urban landscapes has changed as a result of demo-
graphic transformations leading to ‘the formation of neighbourhood congregations
and Bcommunities^ in the context of urban resettlement’ (McLoughlin and Zavos
2014: 160).
– On both the local and the national level, religious communities interact with state
and society, particularly in terms of the politics of recognition and participation in
the context of British multiculturalism. Diaspora religious communities seek to be
2 Steven Vertovec (2009) demarcates transnationalism and diaspora in particular. He defines transnationalism
as referring to the networks and interactions occurring between the homeland and the diaspora. Diaspora,
however, is understood as ‘an imagined connection’ (Vertovec 2009: 136) with the place of origin or a wider
community which can be real but is also imagined in the sense that it purports strong emotive connotations and
is based on collective memory.
3 Werbner (2002: 123) develops the concept of ‘chaordic’ as fusion of ‘chaotic’ and ‘orderly’: diasporic
formations are chaotic by not being directly shaped and guided by central authorities in their countries of
origin and orderly by adhering to set cultural, ideological and doctrinal frameworks that create a certain sense
of co-responsibility across different diasporic communities.
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recognised by the state and other stakeholders in society as representing ‘their’
community.
– On a global level, religious organizations are characterised by trans- and multilocal
networking and activism with their countries of origin or other diaspora commu-
nities across the world.
– On a personal level, diaspora communities contain ‘demotic’ (lit. ‘of the people’)
processes and discourses (Baumann 1996) of individual and collective religiosities:
‘the informal and negotiated utterances and performativity of individuals and non-
institutionalized collectives’ (McLoughlin and Zavos 2014: 161) that challenge
normative discourses and practices promulgated within organized communities.
McLoughlin and Zavos follow recent scholarship on space and religion, in particular
applied to the study of diasporic religion. In order to apply their scheme of the four
spatial scales in which diasporic religions operate to Twelver Shia networks in Brent,
other variables which impact on these processes and unfold within these four spatial
scales need to be included; the ethnic, linguistic and national diversity of these
networks and how they relate to and identify with a transnational Shia community, a
‘Shi’i International’ (Mallat 1998). Issues around social class are crucial to identify
cleavages within the various Shia networks present in London. Networks also form
around particular senior clerical authorities based in Iraq and Iran (marja’ al-taqlid)4
and political movements associated with them and exhibit different positions towards
the Islamic Republic of Iran and Khomeini’s political reading of the mandate of the
legal scholar (wilayat al-faqih).5
The local context: Brent as ‘The Shia Mile of London’
McLoughlin and Zavos identify one of the spatial scales in which diasporic commu-
nities operate as urban neighbourhoods that have been transformed as a result of
immigration. The local context in which the Shia communities and networks are based
is the London borough of Brent, in the north-west of the city. In the last 30 years, Brent
has become one of the global hubs of transnational Shia Islam. There are at least 20
Shia community centres located in Brent representing different national backgrounds
but also different religious and political factions within contemporary Shia Islam. These
community centres, referred to as husayniyya in Arabic and Persian or imambarga in
the South Asian context, are not mosques but congregational halls used for Shia
commemoration ceremonies, in particular those associated with ‘Ashura’, the first ten
days of the Islamic month of Muharram when Shiis worldwide remember and mourn
the death of Prophet Muhammad’s grandson and third Imam Husayn on the plains of
Karbala, in southern Iraq, in 680 CE.
4 Twlever Shii Islam possesses more formalised structures of religious authority. Every lay Shii needs to
follow the religious guidance of a senior cleric and emulate his edicts. These clerics are referred to as grand
ayatollah (ayat allah al-‘uzma) or ‘source of emulation’ (marja‘al-taqlid) (Walbridge 2001: 3–13). The
majority of them a based in the major shrine cities of Iraq and Iran, Najaf and Qom.
5 Khomeini developed the argument that the most learned Shia cleric is not only the ultimate source of
religious guidance but ought to become the head of an Islamic state. On his concept see Calder (1982).
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The vast majority of these centres are run and frequented by Iraqi Shiis who began to
arrive in Brent in the 1970s and have continued to settle in the area as a result of their
oppression under the regime of Saddam Hussein and of the most recent sectarian
violence post-2003 (Degli Esposti 2018a, 2018b). With Iraqis being dominant, other
ethnic and national groups likewise frequent and run various community centres,
including Gulf Arab, Iranian, Afghan and South Asian Shiis. Brent hosts two offices
representing the most influential senior cleric in contemporary Shiism, Najaf-based Ali
Al-Sistani (b. 1930). These offices are run by two of his sons in law, the Imam Ali
Foundation by London-based Murtadha Kashmiri and the Al Al-Bayt Foundation by
Jawad Shahrestani who heads Sistani’s office in Qom, Iran. The Islamic Centre of
England acts of the official representation of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Ali Khamenei (b. 1939). Other senior clerical offices run offices
representing them in the area as well. The Najaf-based cleric Muhammad Al-Fayyadh
(b. 1930) has an office in the Al-Khoei Foundation, for example.
Apart from representing different clerical authorities, various educational initiatives
have been established. The Al Sadiq and Al Zahra schools are independent boy and girl
schools run by the Al-Khoei Foundation. The Islamic College offers both traditional
Shia seminarian courses as well as academic programmes in Islamic Studies with the
latter being validated by Middlesex University. The Islamic College is part of the global
network of institutions affiliated and supported by the Al-Mustafa International Uni-
versity which has its headquarters in Qom (Sakurai 2015). The International College of
Islamic Sciences (Al-jami‘a al-‘alamiyya lil-‘ulum al-islamiyya) is a private institution
that runs postgraduate research programmes in Arabic primarily. Two community
centres run academic outreach activities inviting academics of various backgrounds
to lectures, seminars and workshops and publishing academic work; the Centre for
Academic Shi’a Studies, based at the Al-Khoei Foundation, and the Centre for Shi’a
Islamic Studies at the Imam Jawad Centre.
Brent is one of the most multicultural areas in London with a long history of
immigration, initially of Jews and Irish in the late nineteenth century. Due to the later
arrival of Afro-Caribbean, South Asian and Eastern European immigrants the majority
of the population in Brent come from ethnic minority groups (Borough of Brent 2013:
19). As a result, the strong presence of Shia institutions, centres and networks blends
into the normality of the wider multicultural urban landscape of Brent. One does not
notice the prominence of Shia religious and educational institutions in Brent in
particular as they are not necessarily visible as Shia institutions but as Islamic centres
located next to Sunni mosques, Buddhist and Hindu temples or synagogues. Within the
spatial imaginaire of Shiis living in London, however, Brent is known as the ‘Shia mile
of London’, or as a pun on Brent’s designation as ‘People’s Republic of Brent’ due to
its history of leftist politics in the 1970s and 80s, as the ‘Islamic Republic of Brent’.
Several factors account for the concentration of Shiis, particularly but not exclu-
sively from Iraq. One has to do with the urban geography of Brent and its connection to
central London. Kilburn, Cricklewood and other areas of Brent are located around the
main road connecting the north-west of London with Edgware Road in central London.
Edgware Road is one of the first destinations of Arabs arriving in London as the ‘Arab
quarter’ of the city with various Arab restaurants, businesses and cultural and religious
institutions. Given rising house prices and rents in central London, Brent as the
northern extension of Edgware Road became a location for Arabs, Iraqis and Gulf
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Arabs in particular, to settle in more affordable housing. Furthermore, Brent had
experienced different waves of immigration before and therefore provided an urban
environment used to the settlement of diverse migrant communities.
The settlement of Shia Muslims in Brent is also a good example of chain migration.
In the early 1970s, an Iranian cleric moved to London for missionary purposes and to
cater for the religious needs of the city’s growing Iranian Shia population. He decided to
move with his family to Willesden Green in Brent because the area was home to two of
the few secondary schools in London that were both non-denominational and gender-
segregated. His home also became a centre for religious activities, catering for the then
small Iraqi and Iranian Shia communities in London. The move of an affluent Afghan
Shia family to Brent which held religious gatherings at their home in Brent for Persian-
speaking Shiis from Iran and Afghanistan contributed to the emergence of a nascent Shia
religious infrastructure in Brent attracting other Shiis to settle in the borough as well.
Given the rising number and increasing concentration of Shiis in the area as part of chain
migration, centres catering for the religious and educational needs of the growing
community were also established in or moved to the area in order to part of the nascent
Shia hub in Brent from the mid-1980s onwards. In the late 1980s, Shiis living in Brent
approached the thenmost senior Shia cleric in Iraq at that time, Abu Al-QaismAl-Khoei
(1899–1992) to sponsor the construction of an Islamic school. A site was chosen by
local Shiis leading to the establishment of the Al-Khoei Foundation next to the school in
1989, run by one of Al-Khoei’s son and acting at his official representation and financial
centre until his demise in 1992 (Corboz 2012, 2015: 57–64). Other organisations and
institutions followed suit. The Islamic Centre of England was established in 1995 and
opened its premises in Maida Vale in 1998, south of Brent, at a location close to Shia
communities in the area. Other centres and groups also moved from more central
locations in London to Brent in the 1990s. Rasool Al-Adham, an Iraqi Shii community
centre established in 1986 and affiliated with the Shirazi clerical network, moved from
Edgware Road to Cricklewood in 1998 (Youtube 2012).
Brent’s ‘Shia mile of London’ is a good example of the urban concentration of
diasporic communities in a particular locality. Within the fairly small diasporic space of
Brent the current diversity of contemporary Shia Islam, in terms of clerical allegiance,
ideological orientation, ethnic and national background and socio-economic status
becomes visible. As such, Brent as the diasporic locality of various Shia networks
occupies a unique space among other Shia Muslim communities in Britain and Western
countries more generally. The spatial vicinity of various Shia congregations and centres
creates opportunities for collaboration among them and with other civil society actors
but also exposes various cleavages based on politics, factional identity and class which
are not necessarily apparent within other Shia diasporic communities. In addition, the
role of Brent as a global hub of transnational Twelver Shiism demarcates it from other
Shia diasporic spaces: the concentration of an Iraqi Shia population in the area provides
further opportunities for the spatial segregation of Iraqi Shiis with minimal engagement
with Shiis from other ethnic groups, other Muslims or wider British society (Degli
Esposti 2018b). As one of the centres of Iraqi Shia diasporic politics until the fall of
Saddam Hussein in 2003, Brent has played a significant role in organising the Iraqi
Shia opposition in exile (Rahe 1996). The article will focus on a number of Iraqi and
Iranian centres, organisations and groups, some of which have their own facilities,
while others organise their communal religious activities outside of major centres. All
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of them provide good case studies of the diverse dynamics involved in the formation of
these networks, their relationship and interaction with one another, their transnational
connectivity and activism and their interactions with wider British society.
The politics of recognition: Interaction with state and society
McLoughlin and Zavos refer to the wider political and societal space in which religious
communities are embedded and with which they interact in various ways. The politics
of multicultural recognition has increasingly emphasised religion as a major site of
communal identities and public representation in the British context with the state being
‘a key force in constructions of religion as the main site for legitimate identity’
(McLoughlin and Zavos 2014: 165). In the institutional field of Shia Islam in Britain
the Al-Khoei Foundation, based in Brent, has been the major Shia actor in the politics
of multicultural recognition, being the quasi-official representative of Twelver Shia
Muslims in Britain. The Al-Khoei Foundation in London, being the centre of a global
network of different institutions, operates locally, nationally and internationally in its
various outreach activities. Internationally, it is well-connected to international organi-
sations such as the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, making regular interventions
in its sessions, the Jordanian Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies, established by
Hasan ibn Talal, and Ali Al-Hashimi, the judicial and religious advisor to the President
of the United Arab Emirates. These two latter relations have resulted in the Al-Khoei
Foundation being involved in high-profile international interfaith and Sunni-Shia intra-
faith dialogue events.
Nationally, the Al-Khoei Foundation is usually approached by the British govern-
ment and its various departments for advice on issues affecting Shia Muslims in Britain.
The Al-Khoie Foundation is also a member of the Religious Education Council of
England and Wales, a lobby group to promote the school subject of RE nationally that
includes various religious organisations, interfaith initiatives and other relevant stake-
holders. On a local level, the Al-Khoei Foundation is involved in various interfaith and
civic initiatives such as the London Interfaith Centre, the Three Faiths Forum, the
Faiths Forum London or the Brent Interfaith Network and other civic society actors
such as the North London branch of Citizens UK (Al-Khoie Foundation n.d.).
In representing Shia Islam in the British public arena, the Al-Khoei Foundation has
been extremely successful and conceives itself as an organisation that seeks to achieve
‘community cohesion’ (Al-Khoie Foundation [n.d.]) and to represent Shia Muslims as an
integrated part of British society. It thereby is also willing to push the boundaries of inter-
communal relations locally. In October 2016, under the umbrella of the Faiths Forum
London, the Al-Khoei Foundation hosted the Jewish sukkot festival in partnership with
the neighbouring Brondesbury Park United Synagogue, with volunteers from both
communities building a wooden booth on the premises of the Al-Khoei Foundation
(repeated again in 2017). The event was presented in the media as ‘a historic first in the
UK’ (Cohen 2016), an ‘unprecedented partnership between a British mosque and syna-
gogue’ (Anonymous 2016), as ‘a London mosque has played host for a local synagogue’s
succah’ (Cohen 2016). This highly symbolic gesture to articulate the commitment of the
Al-Khoei Foundation to break down barriers between Jews and Muslims in Britain was
inspired by the rise of anti-Semitic and Islamophobic hate crimes following the Brexit
Contemporary Islam
referendum in June 2016. It was also meant to further buttress the moderate credentials of
the Al-Khoei Foundation in a multicultural context in which ‘faith is projected as
Bbridging^ capital – a common denominator of the universal signifiers of respect for
difference and spirituality’ (McLoughlin and Zavos 2014: 175).
The effectiveness of the Al-Khoei Foundation in representing Shia Islam in the
British public is also evident when it lobbies for a decidedly Shia stance. In November
2014, the UK Department of Education launched a consultation process to revise the
curriculum for Religious Studies at secondary schools in England and Wales to acquire
the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) and the Advanced Level
General Certificate of Education (A-levels) in this subject. The public consultation
included various stakeholders such as religious organisations. Among the three Muslim
organisations consulted in the development of the subject content were the more Sunni-
oriented Muslim Council of Britain, The Oxford Foundation - a Muslim educational
trust that promotes interfaith understanding - and the Al-Khoei Foundation (Depart-
ment of Education 2014: 16). The new curriculum, developed after the consultation
process, introduces significant changes to the way of how Islam is approached and
covered in secondary schools and gives equal weighting to Sunni and Shia perspectives
on Islam. The new GCSE curriculum covers ‘the six articles of faith in Sunni Islam and
five roots of ‘Usul ad-Din in Shi’a Islam’ (Ofqual 2015: 17). In terms of the basic
practices of Islam, it presents both ‘the Five Pillars of Sunni Islam and Ten Obligatory
Acts of Shi’a Islam’ (Ofqual 2015: 18) and ‘the origins and meaning of festivals and
commemorations: such as Id-ul-Adha, Id-ul-Fitr, Id-ul-Ghadeer and Ashura’ (Ofqual
2015: 18), with the latter two being explicitly Shia holidays not observed by Sunni
Muslims.
While details about the consultation process are not published, the strong Shia
imprint on the revised curriculum results from the input of the Al-Khoei Foundation
at very early stages. Its involvement in various interfaith networks at national level such
as the Three Faiths Forum and in the RE Council of England and Wales laid the
groundwork for the Foundation’s strong impact in the consultation process. The explicit
inclusion of Shia Islam in the new curriculum was also driven by the RE Council of
England and Wales which was eager to arrive at a more balanced RE provision on
Islam that would sufficiently recognize its internal diversity. Following the implemen-
tation of the revised curriculum, the Al-Khoei Foundation has also been instrumental in
providing expertise on Shia Islam. It has run a series of workshops including Muslim
(Shia and Sunni) and non-Muslim presenters and also developed a teacher’s manual on
Shia Islam (Bdaiwi and Hussain 2017) to provide teachers with the expertise to
implement the revised curriculum.
The various outreach activities of the Al-Khoei Foundation illustrate its ‘cosmopol-
itan’ character. Its transformation from a clerical network representing Grand Ayatollah
Al-Khoei in Britain to a transnational NGO with vast array of religious, educational and
charitable activities help to buttress the Foundation’s credentials as a ‘moderate voice’
within British Islam. While the Al-Khoei Foundation as part of a transnational network
is connected to Iraq, various other countries in the Middle East and its different
branches across the globe, in the British context it has been the main interlocutor for
the public and the government in matters pertaining to Shia Islam. In this sense, the Al-
Khoie Foundation is quite unique among the more established centres in Brent being
the most outward looking as compared to most other networks present in the area which
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are run by first generation immigrants from Iraq or Iran and reveal a strong diasporic
consciousness attempting to recreate their homeland in the religious congregations they
frequent. Political lobbying and public relations activities of the Al-Khoie Foundation
began in the early 1990s in response to the persecution of Iraqi Shiis following their
failed uprising against Saddam Hussein in 1991 (Rahe 1996: 125–128). Given the
international pressure and isolation of Iraq at that time, the Al-Khoie Foundation
framed their support for Shiis as an international human rights issue to win support
of political stakeholders and eschewed any association with Shia opposition groups
supported by Iran. Abu Al-Qasim Al-Khoie’s own political stance helped to buttress
further the ‘apolitical’ credentials of the Foundation: his clerical leadership is often
portrayed as remaining aloof from politics and opposed to Khomeini’s understanding of
wilayat al-faqih (Corboz 2015: 168–172). Avoiding any involvement in party politics,
whether in the British diaspora or in Iraq, and retaining distance to Iran have allowed
the Al-Khoie Foundation to become a legitimate representative of Shia Islam within the
British public.
At the same time, the Al-Khoie Foundation runs a religious congregation and
community centre (husayniyya) that holds religious events central to the Shia calendar
such as commemorations during ‘Ashura’. These events, held in the main hall of the
community centre in Arabic, primarily attract middle-aged middle- and upper-class
Iraqis. The gathering (majlis) consists of a lecture by a religious scholar, the recitation
of poetry combined with rhythmic self-beating (latmiyya). These quite traditional
gatherings show that the Al-Khoei Foundation also caters to a significant extent for
the religious and spiritual needs of a specific segment of the Iraqi Shia diaspora in
London, upward mobile Iraqi Shiis who identify themselves with the clerical authorities
in Najaf, southern Iraq (najafi marja’iyya). In this respect, the Al-Khoie Foundation is a
good example of the multivocality of diasporic religions being quite ‘ethnic-parochial’
in terms of its religious activities directed towards a particular segment of their own
community while appearing as a progressive and ‘cosmopolitan’ voice in its public
representation in the British context. These two sides of the Foundation are also visible
in the spatial separation between the offices of the Foundation on one side of its
compound and the actual congregation hall located on the other side in a former
synagogue. The resident scholar and imam of the congregation, Fadhil Milani, while
being centrally involved in various interfaith activities of the Foundation, serves also as
an important source for the religious legitimacy of the Foundation within the Iraqi Shia
community, by being one of the students of Grand Ayatollah Al-Khoie and personal
link to the clerical authorities in Najaf.
Diasporic politics: ‘Long-distance nationalism’
The various Shia congregations and institutions based in Brent, as the example of the
Al-Khoie Foundation illustrates, are a good example of ‘the construction of a wide
range of networks and religioscapes which extend beyond, and arguably sometimes
transcend, the spatial scales of both the local and the national’ (McLoughlin and Zavos
2014: 168). Many centres are also involved in ‘long-distance nationalism’ (Anderson
1992) engaging with, responding to and shaping national politics in their countries of
origin. This is particularly the case of the Iraqi Shia diaspora in Brent, many of whom
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were political dissidents in Iraq and forced to exile as a result of state oppression against
Shiis during Saddam Hussein’s regime.
A prime example of an institution engaged in ‘long-distance nationalism’ in Brent is
Dar al-Islam, a Shia congregation and community centre that acts as the London base of
the Hizb Al-Da’wa, the main Shia Islamist party in Iraq that has led the government
from 2005 to 2018. The centre was established in 1991 and moved to its current
premises in 1993. Similar to the Al-Khoie Foundation the Dar Al-Islam centre serves
several purposes. It is a community centre running religious events according to the
Shia calendar and attracts primarily middle- and upper-class Iraqis, secular educated
professionals who have achieved a certain socio-economic status.
Being the official base of the Hizb Al-Da’wa, it was the main site of diasporic politics
of Iraqi Shia Islamists in exile and still retains an important role as conduit between the
party in Iraq and the Iraqi diaspora in London. The 1992 programme of the party, entitled
‘Our Programme (barnamijuna)’, was written by party leaders in London. In the
programme, the party commits itself for the first time to supporting a pluralistic demo-
cratic system in Iraq post-Saddam Hussein (Rahe 1996: 69). Following the fall of
Saddam Hussein in 2003, many members and attendees of Dar Al-Islam have returned
to Iraq and assumed important political, economic or cultural roles. Two post-2003 prime
ministers of Iraq, Ibrahim Al-Jaafari (b. 1947) and Haider Al-Abadi (b. 1952), were
affiliated to the centre. Its former resident scholar and imam Husayn Al-Shami Al-
Musawi returned to Iraq to establish a private university and other members now hold
senior positions in government departments in Iraq. From the setup of the centre it is not
visible that this congregation is affiliated to Hizb Al-Da’wa; it does not exhibit any Iraqi
flags or other symbols of Iraqi national identity nor any images, slogans or logos of the
party as such. One can only observe indirect signs suggesting a connection to the main
Iraqi Shia Islamist party. On the office walls of the director of the congregation are
photographs of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr (1935–1980) who was the founder of the
party and of Muhammad Fadlallah (1935–2010) who was the clerical reference point
(marja’ al-taqlid) for many members of Hizb Al-Da’wa (Abd Al-Jabbar 2003).
While the affiliation with Hizb Al-Da’wa is not very apparent and the Dar Al-Islam
serves as a conventional husayniyya, differences to other centres can be observed.
During major Shia events and their celebration or commemoration in the centre, the
actual commemorative gathering with a sermon and devotional practices is not that well
attended. The majority of male attendees roam around in the lobby or move from the
main hall to the lobby to engage in conversations and socializing. For many attendees,
the role of Dar Al-Islam as the London base for Iraq’s former governing party makes it
an important site for political, business-related or cultural networking. On certain
occasions, the affiliation of Dar al-Islam to Hizb Al-Da’wa becomes more apparent.
When Mohammad Mehdi Al-Asefi6 (1938/9–2015), former spokesperson of the party
and representative of the Supreme Leader of Iran in Iraq, passed away in June 2015, a
memorial gathering was held in the centre. Standing posters with the logo of the Hizb
Al-Da’wa were erected while a speaker gave an outline of his biography and political
achievements for the party and for ‘the Islamic movement (al-haraka al-islamiyya)’
6 As official representative of the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, in Iraq, Al-Asefi entertained close
relations with central figures within the Iranian regime. Al-Asefi collected Khomeini’s lectures in Najaf in the
late 1960s in which the latter outlined his vision of an Islamic state (Al-Siyyad 2017/8: 53).
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more generally. The gathering expressed respect for the life of a former high-profile
member of the Hizb Al-Da’wa and his role in its formation; equally, it signalled a
certain closeness of the party’s base in London to Iran by honouring Khamenei’s
representative in Iraq – a rapport often denounced by Iraqi Shiis in London opposed
to the Iranian regime.
For McLoughlin and Zavos, the transnational networking of diasporic communities
can entail and articulate various modes of ‘religious resistance to globalized modernity’
(2014: 170). As an Islamist party (albeit of Shia provenance), Hizb Al-Da’wa shares
similar ideological roots with Sunni Islamist movements and retains the pan-Islamic
appeal of political Islam to a certain extent. In June 2015, the centre hosted a conference
organized by the Islamic Unity Forum (muntada al-wahda al-islamiyya), a London-
based organization bringing Shia and Sunni Islamist activists together. Shia Islamists
from the Gulf, Iraq, Yemen and Iran were equally present as Sunni Islamists from
Egypt and other North African countries. A recurring theme of the conference was the
need for unified Muslim resistance against Western imperialism and its ‘politics of
division (siyasat al-taqsim)’, evident historically in the division of the Middle East
following the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, the creation of Israel and the Saudi-led
war against Yemen. In an effort to overcome sectarian fault lines so prominent in the
Middle East post-Arab Spring, speakers of Sunni and Shia backgrounds repudiated the
rise of sectarianism on either side and promoted Islamic unity to counter Western
geopolitical hegemony. Zionism, in particular, was blamed as ‘the reason for the
divisions among Muslims (sabab ikhtilaf bayna al-muslimin)’ and ‘among the Shia
in particular (wa-bayna al-shi’a khassatan)’.
The discourses during this annual gathering of Islamists of both backgrounds reflect
the pan-Islamic and anti-imperialist orientation of political Islam more generally. They
are, however, equally illustrative of the particular ideological position of Hizb Al-
Da’wa’s London base. The presence of Shia Islamist activists from Iran, the Gulf and
Houthis from Yemen with close political and ideological ties to Iran signifies that Dar
Al-Islam as Hizb Al-Da’wa’s London branch retains links to individuals and move-
ments that are close to Iran. The inclusion of Sunni Islamists in the conference equally
reflects the official discourse of the Iranian regime emphasising Islamic unity as
resistance to Western imperialism and rejecting any sectarianization of current geopo-
litical conflicts in the Middle East (Akbarzadeh 2015). Such discourses equally stand in
contrast to the sectarian politics attributed to the Hizb Al-Da’wa in Iraq, suggesting that
the position of its rank-and-file members in London towards Iran and Sunni Islamism is
more complex than often assumed in the Iraqi context (Al-Qarawee 2014).
Dar Al-Islam exhibits a strong sense of ‘long-distance nationalism’ among the Brent
Shia congregations and oscillates in its activities between the promotion of sectarian
discourses and politics within an Iraqi context and a sense of pan-Islamic anti-imperi-
alist resistance to Western hegemony. Other congregations promote an Iraqi Shia
diasporic consciousness by using religio-cultural activities to forge distinct Shia sec-
tarian identities. The Al-Hussaini Association (al-majlis al-husayni), referred to in the
community as Balaghiyyeh, emphasises a particular style of Iraqi Shia folklore that
places ritual activities as its centre to articulate an Iraqi Shia identity in the diaspora.
The Association, established in 1985, is run by the prominent Balaghi family from
Najaf and organizes commemorative gatherings during ‘Ashura’ in particular. The
Balaghiyyeh is a good example of the spatial ‘extension’ (Knott 2009: 156) religious
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diasporas undertake. In its religious gatherings, the Balaghiyyeh connects Brent with
southern Iraq by recreating the rituals, discourses and overall atmosphere of a com-
memorative gathering in the homeland; speakers are invited from either Iraq or other
countries in the Gulf, and there is a strong emphasis on the role Shia rituals play in
maintaining the emotional and imagined link with the homeland (Shanneik 2018).
The Balaghiyyeh encourages in particular the inclusion of elements of Iraqi Shia
folklore. During the last five nights of ‘Ashura’, male members of the congregation
carry the mash’al (lit. ‘torch’), a thick iron bar in the shape of a crescent held by
wooden carriers with belts attached to it. It can be up to three metres long and is
decorated with lanterns in different shapes and colours and other glass decorations that
reflect the light from the lanterns. The mash’al symbolises the torch on the camel seat
that carried the women and children from the family of the Prophet who survived
Karbala and were taken to Damascus (Haydari 2015: 107–108). Other rituals include
holding a mock wedding procession for Qasim, the son of Husayn’s brother, on the
ninth night of ‘Ashura’. A little boy is dressed up as Qasim with a multi-layered tablet,
decorated with lanterns and flowers and a miniature dome-structure on top (qubbat al-
qasim), carried around. The procession is accompanied by drums and trumpets and
flags being waved. The inclusion of Iraqi Shia material culture in the ritual activities
give these gatherings a particular sense of authenticity and originality.
While such efforts to recreate an Iraqi Shia homeland which involves specific
elements of Shia ritual culture suggests an understanding of Iraqi Shia identity defined
in religio-cultural terms, background information on the Balaghi family on the website
of the Al-Hussaini Association illustrates that such Shia ritual practices are imbued with
political meaning. Information is provided on one of the ancestors of the Balaghi
family, a prominent Shia cleric from Najaf, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Jawad Al-
Balaghi (1865/6–1933/4) who participated in the 1920 Shia uprising against British
mandate rule (Tripp 2007:39–44). Further information is provided on the late ‘Abd Al-
Rasul Al-Balaghi, the founder of the Balaghiyyeh in London, by highlighting his
participation in a major demonstration against Saddam Hussein in 1977. After a general
clampdown on the public performance of Shia ritual activities in Iraq in the 1970s, the
march from Najaf to the shrine of Imam Husayn in Karbala on the occasion of Arba’in,
40 days after the commemoration of his martyrdom, was banned by the Iraqi authorities
in 1977. Shia pilgrims went on their march defying the ban and turned it into a major
demonstration against Saddam Hussein’s regime (Aziz 1993: 213–214). The biograph-
ical sketch on Balaghi does not provide much information on him but re-narrates the
1977 demonstration during the march to Karbala (The Hussaini Association 2017).
Hence, the accounts demonstrate the role of ritual activities as a tool to articulate a
distinct Shia identity and to counter political oppression. By highlighting the anti-
regime activities of prominent members of Balaghi family in Iraq, the political creden-
tials of the Balaghiyyeh as a place where this ritual heritage is kept alive in the diaspora
are further advanced.
The organisers of the Balaghiyyeh, as natives of Najaf, follow the clerical leadership
of Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, and his London representative and son-in-law
Murtadha Kashmiri regularly attends and speaks at the gatherings. The spatial exten-
sion occurring in this particular Shia space in London also leads to certain discursive
dissonances. In one of his talks, given during ‘Ashura’ in 2015, Kashmiri was critical of
young Iraqis leaving their country, ‘the country of the Commander of the Faithful
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(balad amir al-mu’minin [Imam ‘Ali]).’ This statement was most likely motivated by
the migrant and refugee crisis Europe experienced in the summer of 2015 which also
included the influx of Iraqis fleeing ISIS. At the same time, Kashmiri also acknowl-
edged the particular challenges of raising Shiis in the diaspora, stressing the importance
of learning Arabic as ‘the language of our creed (lughat ‘aqidatuna).’ In 2016, in one of
first nights of ‘Ashura’ of that season, Kashmiri emphasised the role young Shiis in the
West play as representatives of Islam and as role-models for Shia Islam who should
aspire to the highest moral standards and follow the laws of Islam while at the same
time adhering to the laws of the country in which they live. In these statements, that
appear contradictory, the ‘dual orientation’ of diasporic communities comes to the fore:
the Balaghiyyeh recreates an Iraqi Shia ritual universe in the diaspora and invites
representatives of clerical authorities in Iraq to communicate its perspectives on current
affairs (such as a reprimand to young Iraqis leaving their country). At the same time, it
is also used as a space to remind young Shiis (and their parents) living in London of the
core elements of their religion and their responsibilities as a minority community in the
West. In the age of ISIS, a particular responsibility falls on Shiis living as a minority in
the West to represent a different image of Islam and to ensure that Shia Muslims and
their distinct sectarian identity are visible in the public and demarcated from violent
expression of Sunni Islam.
Being ‘apolitical’ and Shii: The demotic potential of Shia religious folk
culture
The Al-Khoie Foundation, Dar Al-Islam and Balaghiyyeh are all connected with the
Iraqi centres of Shia Islam, whether the clerical authorities based on Najaf or Shia
Islamist politics as embodied by Hizb Al-Da’wa. Other congregations make efforts to
demarcate themselves from both the clerical leadership in Najaf and various expres-
sions of political Islam in Shiism. Demotic processes and discourses to promote
‘alternative’ understandings of Shia religiosity to ‘resist their marginalization and
disciplining by secular nation-states, neo-orthodox movements and consumer capital-
ism’ (McLoughlin and Zavos 2014: 172) can also be observed. Within the Shia field of
Brent, the so-called Shiraziyyin are a prominent example of a movement within
contemporary Shia Islam that stands outside the clerical establishment of Najaf and
‘neo-orthodox’ discourses stemming both from Hizb Al-Da’wa and the Islamic Re-
public of Iran.
The Shiraziyyin constitute a global network of clerical families, their followers and
political groups who adhere to the religious and socio-political teachings of Muham-
mad Al-Shirazi (1928–2001) and his younger brothers. Stemming from a prominent
clerical family in Karbala, Shirazi challenged the pre-eminence and political quietism
of the clerical establishment in Najaf in the 1960s. Initially with close ideological ties to
Khomeini, Shirazi settled in Qom, Iran, in 1979 and facilitated the export of
Khomeini’s ideology to Shia communities in the Gulf region (Louër 2008: 88–99).
However, Muhammad Al-Shirazi grew increasingly disillusioned by the Iranian regime
and articulated his opposition to Khomeini. He was placed under house arrest and died
in 2001. His younger brother Sadiq Al-Shirazi (b. 1942) has acted as clerical leader of
the Shiraziyyin since then.
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In Brent, the Rasool Al-Adham has been the community centre congregating
Shiraziyyin based in London since 1986. When examining the demographics of the
Rasool Al-Adham congregation social class and regional identity markers are visible
separating this congregation from other Iraqi Shia centres. Rasool Al-Adham primarily
attracts a lower middle- and working-class congregation in contradistinction to the
middle- and upper-class attendees of Al-Khoie and Dar Al-Islam. Regional identity
markers are equally important. Being the followers of a prominent clerical family that
originally hailed from Karbala, the Shiraziyyin in London primarily come from the
Iraqi shrine city in which the third Shia Imam Husayn is buried.7
The role of Shia rituals in forging diasporic identities in Brent and as part of ‘long-
distance nationalism’ has already been highlighted in relation to the Balaghiyyeh
community centre. In the context of Rasool Al-Adham, the emphasis on the perfor-
mance of Shia rituals is not only intended to recreate a Shia Iraqi space but serves further
political purposes and is also used to give the Shiraziyyin in London a niche position
within the ‘market-place’ of different Shia community centres in the area. Comparing
the performance Shia rituals in the different congregations in Brent during the period of
‘Ashura’, the author was struck by their emotional intensity in Rasool Al-Adham.While
in other community centres, efforts were made to control and subdue the passionate
display of emotions during the ritual performances, those leading and involved in their
performance in Rasool Al-Adham encouraged the congregations to express their devo-
tion to the family of the Prophet in their strongest possible terms. The author observed
the most intense rhythmic self-beating (latmiyya) in London in Rasool Al-Adham.
The material culture of Iraqi Shia folklore also plays a prominent role in the centre’s
ritual practice. The main wall of the husayniyya is decorated with a takiyya, a display of
dozens of lambs in different colours which is an Iranian cultural tradition; such lamb
displays are usually placed in front of houses in which the loss of a family member is
mourned. Other ritual practices are performed in Rasool Al-Adham that are outwardly
rejected by other Iraqi Shia congregations in Brent. Rasool Al-Adham is one of the few
congregations in London that performs Shia passion plays (tashabih). The march of the
survivors of the massacre in Karbala, in particular of Husayn’s sister Zaynab, his
daughter Ruqayya and his son and fourth Imam ‘Ali Zayn Al-‘Abidin, to Damascus
as captives and their humiliation in front of the Umayyad caliph Yazid are re-enacted in
the husayniyya. Other more controversial practices, performed in Rasool Al-Adham on
the day of ‘Ashura’ itself, include self-flagellation, hitting the forehead with a sword to
cause bleeding (tatbir), and walking on hot coal (mashy ‘ala al-jamr). The latter
practice illustrate the syncretic nature of Shia ritual practices; the Shiraziyyin in Karbala
adopted walking on hot coal from South Asian Shiis when they performed a pilgrimage
to the shrine of Imam Husayn in the 1960s.
All these elements create a particular ‘aesthetic style’ (Meyer 2009: 9) in Rasool Al-
Adham that positions the Shiraziyyin uniquely within the Shia field in Brent and also
delivers a political message. The Shiraziyyin and their clerical leaders have entertained
difficult relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, following the estrangement of
Muhammad Al-Shirazi from Khomeini and when ‘Ali Khamenei became Supreme
Leader of Iran. Khamenei is one of the few senior clerics in contemporary Shia Islam
who, in 1994, explicitly declared the performance of self-flagellation unlawful (haram).
7 The majority of Shiis living in Karbala are followers of Muhammad and Sadiq Al-Shirazi.
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As a consequence, congregations affiliated to Iran or close to it have shunned this
practice. Maintaining its performance by the Shiraziyyin is therefore also an act of
political defiance, rejecting the hegemonic ambitions of the political establishment in
Iran to exercise transnational control over Shia Islam. The Shiraziyyin also reject
initiatives by the Islamic Republic and its clerical representatives to tone down the
emotional intensity of Shia rituals and their sectarian message (such as cursing some of
the Companions of the Prophet or the early Umayyad caliphs) to avoid antagonising
and alienating Sunni Muslims. For the Shiraziyyin in London, this is an effort by the
Iranian regime to deprive Shia Islam of its authentic identity by ridding it of those
features that most significantly separate it from Sunni Islam (Dogra 2017). The
Shiraziyyin in London accuse in particular the two community centres affiliated with
political Shiism, Dar Al-Islam and the Iranian-sponsored Islamic Centre of England, of
undermining the significance of Shia ritual practices to appease Sunni Muslims.
Another example of ‘demotic processes’ occurring in Brent is a small initiative of
Iranian Shiis to create their own ritual space outside of the Islamic Centre of England,
the community centre representing the Supreme Leader of Iran. Since 2012, a group of
lay Iranian Shiis has organised religious activities according to the Shia religious
calendar. Without a physical space of their own, the group has used different facilities
across Brent. The attendees of the events are devout middle- and upper-class Iranian
Shiis and also include a number of second-generation Iranians living in London. While
the majority of the Iranian diaspora in Britain is secular, if not explicitly, anti-Islamic
(Gholami 2014, 2015; Gholami and Sreberny 2018), this group consists of Iranians
who identify as Shia and seek alternative spaces to practice their religious identity.
While not articulating an oppositional stance to the Islamic Republic and its spatial
manifestation in the Islamic Centre in London, the organisers characterise themselves as
‘non-political’ in their approach. Their choice to run a Persian-speaking programme outside
of the Islamic Centre provides themwith more freedom in terms of speakers they can invite,
the performance of rituals as well as their outreach to segments of the Iranian Shia diaspora
who are not secular but would not feel comfortable attending religious events run by
organizations associated with the Iranian regime. In 2015 and 2016, the group invited a
religious speaker from Iran coming from a prominent family of preachers. The speaker’s
father was a popular preacher in Iran before the Islamic Revolution and part of the so-called
velayatis, a group of scholars and preachers (vo’az) who emphasised the adherence to the
authority and leadership (Arabic: wilaya, Persian: velayat) of the Twelve Imams. The
velayatis opposed in particular the activities and discourses of ‘Ali Shari’ati (1933–1977),
an important ideologue of the Islamic Revolution (Rahnema 1998: 266–276).
At the religious gatherings in London, the preacher’s lectures mostly focused on
spiritual topics or the proper performance of rituals. In one of his lectures, the speaker
emphasised the central authority of the Mahdi whose sovereignty (velayat) over-
shadows any other authority. Taking this point even further, the speaker stated that all
the writings and scholarship of the clerics are obliterated in the presence of the Mahdi.
Such statements are prima facie common iterations of fundamental precepts of Twelver
Shiism; upon his appearance, any religious and secular authority will be made redun-
dant. However, such an emphasis on the absolute sovereignty of the Mahdi, even
during the time of his occultation, could be understood as a veiled critique of the
political system in Iran in which the country’s Supreme Leader is invested with almost
all spiritual and secular prerogatives of the Hidden Imam.
Contemporary Islam
The performance of mourning rituals by this group of Iranian Shiis also differed
from those performed in the Islamic Centre of England. While in the official London
representation of the Supreme Leader, rituals are performed in a subdued manner, the
Iranian group exhibited a much stronger emotional intensity when performing rhythmic
self-beating (sine zani in Persian). The room was completely darkened while recordings
of recited devotional poetry were played, accompanied by intense and passionate self-
beating and crying. The reciters whose recordings were played are part of the heyyati
movement in contemporary Iran, a group of lay reciters who represent a contemporary
example of Iranian Shia religious folk culture. Their public performances during Shia
holidays attract large young crowds and are viewed with disdain by the clerical
establishment in the country (Thurfjell 2015).
The demotic Shia spaces created by the Shiraziyyin in Rasool Al-Adham and the
Iranian group in London create ‘the idea of an alternative, utopian, as well as potentially
millenarian and apocalyptic, moral space exceeding the limits of their diasporic location
and minority status’ (McLoughlin and Zavos 2014: 170–171). For the Shiraziyyin this
minority status unfolds and is experienced in three layers: as part of the Muslim
minority in Britain, the Shia minority status within Islam and their marginalized
position within mainstream Shia Islam and its ‘neo-orthodox’ discourses. The
Shiraziyyin counter this sense of marginalization by claiming a unique access to and
representation of authentic Shia Islam. For the older attendees of the small group of
Iranian Shiis organizing their own events outside of the Islamic Centre of England, the
commemorative lectures and subsequent mourning rituals are reminiscent of their
childhood and youth experiences in Iran (see Dabashi 2011: 1–7; Shanneik 2018)
and articulate a certain nostalgia for the homeland in the diaspora. The activities of this
group allow them – as well as young attendees born in Britain – to reconnect with a part
of their identity outside of the more politicized framework of religio-political institu-
tions associated with the Islamic Republic. The particular ‘aesthetic style’ of this group
emphasises aspects of Iranian Shia folklore independent of state control and also
different to the more rationalizing and moralizing ‘aesthetic styles’ of Shia rituals
promoted by movements within political Shiism and their spatial manifestations in
London such as the Islamic Centre of England and Dar Al-Islam. An emphasis on
‘spirituality’ and experienced emotional intensity in the performance of rituals is shared
by both the Shiraziyyin and the Iranian group while both would assess the political
significance of their ‘aesthetic styles’ differently.
Conclusion
The urban concentration of different Shia community centres and organizations in
Brent and their transnational connections with different clerical and political networks
in contemporary Iraqi Shiism in particular allows for a close examination of their
multilocality and complexity. They also reveal their segmented nature: the existence of
different discursive and identitarian layers which are defined by class, clerical alle-
giance and ideological orientation and also strategically employed in their multilocal
emplacement. Their segmentation defies the notion of a single British ‘Shia diaspora’,
as ‘a minority within a minority’, whether Iraqi, Iranian or otherwise and cautions
against generalized accounts of the particular political, ideological or doctrinal stances
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of Iranian, Iraqi and other Shia groups in Britain. A differentiated perspective on these
networks reveals their internal complexity and the simultaneity of divergent discourses,
even within the same network.
On a local and national level, an organization like the Al-Khoie Foundation supports
progressive agendas in its public outreach activities while adhering to traditional
conceptions of religious authority and maintaining a strong diasporic consciousness
among its own constituency in Brent. Transnational connectivities also reveal different
dimensions: they can retain a prima facie religio-cultural emphasis, as the example of
the Balaghiyyeh illustrates, or purport more politicized notions of ‘long-distance
nationalism’, as illustrated by Dar Al-Islam. Yet, even such a delineation does not do
justice to complex discursive layers evident in these centres: with its use of elements of
Iraqi Shia folklore and its explicit connections to the clerical establishment in Najaf, the
Balaghiyyeh maintains diasporic links to the homeland (Werbner 2010: 74) while also
politicizing the memory of such ritual practices as an anti-regime act in the Iraq of
Saddam Hussein to further its credentials within the network of communities in Brent.
Similarly, Dar Al-Islam engages in different types of politics: from an identification and
advancement of sectarian politics in Iraq post-2003 to more pan-Islamic notions of
global Muslim solidarity against Western hegemony, a rejection of sectarian politics
after the Arab Spring and an alignment with religio-political discourses of the Iranian
regime. The co-existence of these different discursive layers within Dar Al-Islam
challenges assumptions of a complete sectarianization of Shia identities in the diaspora
or a clear cleavage between Iraqi and Iranian Shiis in London (Degli Esposti 2018a).
Demotic processes observed within some networks equally reveal different ideolog-
ical positions. Cultivating a particular ‘aesthetic style’ of Shia ritual practices can
articulate a clear and deliberate dissociation from the Islamic Republic of Iran, as the
case of the Shiraziyyin suggests. The Shiraziyyin promote more controversial aspects
of Shia ritual practices to defy their ban by the Iranian leadership. At the same time,
they include in their ritual space aspects of Iranian Shia culture such as the takiyye to
mark the community space as a place of mourning or the recitation of Shia devotional
poetry in Persian. A dissociation from Iranian political control of Shia spaces in the
diaspora can be more implicit and involuntary, when considering the group of Iranian
Shiis in Brent. The orientation of their activities is triggered by nostalgia for aspects of
Iranian Shia folklore lost in the diaspora or by the desire to carve out apolitical spaces
of Shia religiosity outside state control.
A sense of double-marginalization is certainly purported in the public relations
activities of the Al-Khoie Foundation or in other public manifestations of Shia com-
munal identities such as the annual ‘Ashura’ and Arba’in processions in central
London. During such activities discourses emerge that intend to position Shia Muslims
in Britain as representatives of ‘moderate’ Islam and the victims of ‘radical’ versions of
Sunni Islam (Degli Esposti 2018a; Scharbrodt 2011). However, such a strategically
employed discursive positioning conceals the actual cleavages that exist between
different communities and networks. Cleavages do not primarily manifest around
ethnic (Iraqi/Iranian) or sectarian (Shia/Sunni) lines but are more pronounced in terms
of the clerical allegiance and ideological orientation of the discussed networks. Hence,
Twelver Shia Muslims in Brent, their community centres and organisations and the
transnational networks they are part of constitute multilocal and complex ‘social fields’
marked by internal diversity, heterogeneity and power relations: these networks
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delimitate trajectories of actions and discourses and serve as spaces that provide
meaning to their members through shared and contested practices, discourses, symbols
and rituals. Their power relations manifest in conflicting claims to authority and status
within these networks and in political and ideological competitions with other net-
works. They also serve as alternative social spheres outside of state and society
challenging ‘dominant secular readings of civil society and citizenship’ (Vásquez
2010: 302) or the rationalizing and politicizing tendencies of ‘neo-orthodox move-
ments’ (McLoughlin and Zavos 2014: 176).
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